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Introduction
On July 11, 2013, Pennsylvania State University (“Penn State”)
announced planned changes to its employee-health-benefits program
called the “Take Care of Your Health” initiative (“Take Care”). 1 The initiative
was the first component of a larger plan to change health benefits at Penn
State. 2 Take Care included three components and required employees to
comply with all three parts in order for employees to avoid a one-hundreddollar-per-month penalty in the form of a payroll-deducted premium
surcharge. 3 Under Take Care, employees were required to complete an
online health-risk appraisal (“HRA”) managed by WebMD, schedule and
provide documentation of an annual preventive-health exam with a
licensed healthcare provider, and complete a biometric-testing battery. The
biometric testing battery included invasive procedures and questions,
†

Professor of Health Policy and Administration; Associate Dean for Undergraduate
Studies and Outreach, College of Health and Human Development at Pennsylvania
State University.

††

Distinguished Professor of Health Policy and Administration; Director of the
Center for Health Care and Policy Research at Pennsylvania State University.

1.

L. Reider Jensen, ‘Take Care of Your Health’ Initiative Announced Ahead of Open
STATE
NEWS
(Jul.
11,
2013),
Enrollment,
PENN
http://news.psu.edu/story/281346/2013/07/11/administration/%E2%80%98tak
e-care-your-health%E2%80%99-initiative-announced-ahead-open.

2.

See id. (explaining that Take Care of Your Health Initiative was a program to
prepare employees and their families for open enrollment in 2014).

3.

Jill Shockey & L. Reider Jensen, Benefits changes focus on employee wellness, longterm cost savings, PENN STATE NEWS (last updated Aug. 22, 2013),
http://news.psu.edu/story/282659/2013/07/25/administration/benefitschanges-focus-employee-wellness-long-term-cost.
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requiring blood-cholesterol and blood-glucose monitoring, blood-pressure
screening, and measurement of body-mass index and waist circumference. 4
In addition, the university announced changes to its policy on spousal or
same-sex domestic partner (“SSDP”) eligibility for health insurance
benefits. 5 The university required partners to pay a one-hundred dollar-permonth premium surcharge to remain on Penn State’s coverage if they had
access to health insurance through their own employers. 6 The University
also planned a tobacco-use surcharge of seventy-five dollars per month. 7
The announcement occurred during the summer months, 8 a period
when many faculty and staff are not on campus; however, several Penn
State faculty began to voice strong negative reactions that were amplified
by national press attention. 9 Fewer than seventy days later, Penn State
suspended the surcharge in response to faculty and staff concerns and
created a task force to “provide advice on the implementation of the
program and on health benefits matters.” 10
While Penn State is not the first employer to implement a worksitewellness program (“WWP”), the events we describe in more detail below
and the subsequent significant national interest in its program offer a useful
and illustrative case study for the promises and pitfalls of employer
wellness initiatives. In this paper, we use the Penn State experience as a
narrative to highlight some of the key issues with wellness initiatives. We
first focus on the link between the growth of WWPs like Penn State’s and
the Affordable Care Act and its wellness incentives. We then discuss some
of the challenging privacy issues raised during the Penn State discussions.
We subsequently highlight the lack of evidence underlying Penn State’s
wellness programs, connecting the Penn State experience with research on
other employers’ efforts to use wellness as a means for improving
employee health and reducing healthcare costs amid uncertain evidence.
Finally, we conclude with some key future directions related to employers
and wellness.
4.

Jensen, supra note 1; Natasha Singer, Health Plan Penalty Ends At Penn State, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/business/afteruproar-penn-state-suspends-penalty-fee-in-wellness-plan.html (explaining that
WebMD runs the online questionnaire form for the “Take Care of Your Health”
Initiative).

5.

Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3.

6.

Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3.

7.

Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3.

8.

See Jensen, supra note 1; see also Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3.

9.

See Anna Wilde Mathews & Timothy W. Martin, Penn State Workers Protest
Wellness Plan, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2013, at B6.

10.

Lisa Powers & Annemarie Mountz, Penn State Suspends Fee for Employees Who
Don’t Take Health Care Survey, PENN STATE NEWS (Sep.18, 2013),
http://news.psu.edu/story/288132/2013/09/18/administration/penn-statesuspends-fee-employees-who-dont-take-health-care.
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I.

The Affordable Care Act and Wellness Incentives

The passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”) 11 established
the framework for Penn State’s Take Care initiative, since the law included
specific provisions to promote wellness and to allow employers to offer
penalties and incentives for participation in employer-sponsored healthbenefits programs. 12 The ACA modified federal policy regarding employer
wellness initiatives that had been previously created in the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). 13
Specifically, the ACA increased the size of the incentives and penalties tied
to wellness programs allowed in an employer health plan from twenty
percent of the cost of the plan to thirty percent of the cost of the plan. 14
The ACA also increased the size of the incentives and penalties tied to
employee participation in programs related to tobacco use to fifty percent
of the plan’s costs. 15 Disability and privacy advocates raised significant
questions during the discussions surrounding both the original federal
regulations in HIPAA and the changes in the ACA.16 For example, the Center
for Independence of the Disabled in New York, noting that the Office of Civil
Rights in the United States Department of Health and Human Services had
three hundred complaints regarding wellness programs, reviewed the
wellness changes in the ACA and made recommendations for addressing
these concerns. 17
Despite concerns about discrimination and the potential loss of privacy,
employers appear to be willing to implement and expand WWPs because
they believe that the risks associated with doing so are balanced by the
positive effects of wellness programs on employee health and employee

11.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).

12.

See Soeren Mattke et al, A Review of the U.S. Workplace Wellness Market, RAND
CORPORATION
1,
5
(2012),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/workplacewellnessmarketreview2012.pdf.

13.

Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 26
CFR §54, 33158 (2013).

14.

Id. at 33167.

15.

Id. at 33167.

16.

See Kristin Madison, The ACA, The ADA, And Wellness Program Incentives, HEALTH
AFF. BLOG (May 13, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/05/13/the-aca-theada-and-wellness-program-incentives/; Kristin Madison et al., Smoking, Obesity,
Health Insurance, and Health Incentives in the Affordable Care Act, 310 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 143, 143 (2013); see also NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE:
ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds.,
2009) (extensively discussing privacy issues concerning HIPAA).

17.

Heidi Siegfried, The ACA, Wellness Programs, and People with Disabilities, CTR. FOR
INDEPENDENCE
OF
THE
DISABLED
(2014),
http://www.cidny.org/resources/Wellness%20Paper%20MRT%20Group%20final
%202014.pdf.
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and employer healthcare costs. 18 Penn State and its employees have faced
significant increases in healthcare costs, and Penn State leaders described
Take Care as part of the solution to these cost challenges. 19 Penn State is
not alone in implementing WWPs to combat increases in health care costs;
in fact, the expansion of wellness incentives in the ACA is also known as the
Safeway Amendment because of the active role that Safeway’s Chief
Executive Officer played in advocating for the incentives and linking them
to cost savings at his company. 20 Two months prior to the ACA’s passage, a
Washington Post article detailed skepticism about the evidence from
Safeway’s program, describing how the decline in employee costs occurred
three years before wellness incentives were implemented at Safeway and
actually rose faster than average healthcare costs nationwide in the year
after Safeway implemented its wellness program. 21 Nevertheless, the
wellness incentives remained part of the ACA and the incentives that the
ACA provides have resulted in significant growth in the wellness industry,
as vendors market their services to employers with claims of cost savings
while employers face increasing pressure to find solutions to growing
costs. 22
Penn State and its third-party administrator, Highmark, planned to
implement a comprehensive set of benefits changes for 2014 and
communicated more detail to employees on July 25, 2013. 23 These benefit
changes included the following features:
(1) offering a qualified, high-deductible health plan including a
health-savings account as an alternative to its traditional preferredprovider organization (“PPO”) plan;

18.

Peggy Hannon et al., Stakeholder Perspectives on Workplace Health Promotion: A
Qualitative Study of Midsized Employers in Low-Wage Industries, 27 AM. J. OF
HEALTH PROMOTION 103, 18-109 (2012).

19.

Rodney A. Erickson, President’s Message Explains Health Care Benefits Changes at
STATE
NEWS
(Aug.
22,
2013),
Penn
State,
PENN
http://news.psu.edu/story/283812/2013/08/09/administration/presidentsmessage-explains-health-care-benefits-changes-penn.

20.

Brendan Borrell, The Fairness of Health Insurance Incentives, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 3,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/03/health/la-he-health-incentives20110103.

21.

David Hilzenrath, Misleading Claims about Safeway Wellness Incentives Shape
Health-Care Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2010 at G8.

22.

Vicky Valet, More Than Two-Thirds of U.S. Employers Currently Offer Wellness
(Jul.
8,
2015),
Programs,
Study
Says,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/vickyvalet/2015/07/08/more-than-two-thirds-ofu-s-employers-currently-offer-wellness-programs-study-says/#2965faf46c7b.

23.

Jill Shockey & Reider L. Johnson, Health Benefit Choices, Value-Based Design Offer
Lower-Cost Options, PENN STATE NEWS (last updated Aug. 22, 2013),
http://news.psu.edu/story/282685/2013/07/25/administration/health-benefitchoices-value-based-design-offer-lower-cost.
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(2) implementing a value-based benefit design option in the PPO
plan, giving employees with high blood pressure, high cholesterol, or
diabetes the opportunity to eliminate cost-sharing copayments and
deductibles if they complied with preventive care protocols; 24
(3) enacting a one-hundred-dollar-per-month surcharge for
employees’ spouses and SSDPs enrolling in Penn State’s coverage
when coverage was available through their own employer; 25
(4) creating a tobacco-cessation and differential program that
required employees and their spouses or SSDPs to certify each year
that they do not use tobacco or are attempting to quit tobacco use,
and pay a seventy-five-dollar-per-month surcharge per tobacco
user; 26
(5) requiring employees to complete a biometric screening, and
(6) requiring employees and their spouses or SSDPs to complete an
online wellness profile provided by WebMD Health Services and
certify that they have had or will have a preventive physical exam by
their medical provider, with failure to complete these measures also
resulting in a one-hundred-dollar-per-month surcharge. 27

Though the incentives provided for WWPs in the ACA meant that other
employers were implementing these types of benefit changes, Penn State
faculty and staff began raising critical questions about privacy concerns and
the lack of credible evidence supporting the link between WWPs and
employee health and healthcare cost. As we describe below, the program’s
features, lapses in communication between Penn State and its faculty and
staff, and Penn State and Highmark’s inability or refusal to provide
adequate responses to questions led the administrative leadership of Penn
State to suspend the biometric-screening and wellness-profile portions of
the program and initiate further consultation with employees. In the next
two sections, we address these issues of privacy, employee health, and
health care costs.

24.

Id.

25.

Jill Shockey & L. Reider Jensen, Health Care Plan Changes Include Modifications to
Spouse, Partner Costs, PENN STATE NEWS (last updated Aug. 22, 2013),
http://news.psu.edu/story/282688/2013/07/25/administration/health-careplan-changes-include-modifications-spouse-partner.

26.

Jill Shockey & L. Reidar Jensen, University Announces Tobacco Cessation,
Differential Program, PENN STATE NEWS (last updated Aug. 22, 2013),
http://news.psu.edu/story/282692/2013/07/25/administration/universityannounces-tobacco-cessation-differential-program.

27.

Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3.
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II.

Privacy Concerns in Wellness

While an initial Penn State news release indicated that more than a
quarter of the university’s employees had initiated efforts to complete their
wellness profiles and biometric screening after just two weeks, 28 an opinion
article authored by Penn State faculty member Matthew Woessner raised
strong concerns about the ethical and privacy issues associated with
requiring employees to complete online wellness profiles that asked for
sensitive information about mental health, specific illnesses, and alcohol,
tobacco, and drug use. 29
Woessner’s article was preceded by an open letter he wrote to the
Pennsylvania chapter of the American Association of University
Professors. 30 Woessner’s efforts then gained national media coverage. 31
Together, Woessner’s writings about Penn State’s plan galvanized faculty
and staff opinion about the privacy issues. 32 A combination of factors at
Penn State helped to create fertile ground for the growing controversy.
First, some Penn State faculty, including a past head of the University
Faculty Senate, Larry Catá Backer, suggested that the planning for the
initiative was conducted without appropriate input from Penn State faculty
and staff members. 33 Backer also raised concerns that the strategic
announcement of the program in early July, when many faculty members
were not on contract and many staff were on vacation, was timed
specifically to avoid strong reactions from employees. 34
An additional factor added further fuel. Though most employers had
taken an incentive approach to their WWPs, rewarding employees who

28.

Jill Shockey & L. Reidar Jensen, ‘Take Care of Your Health’ Sees Record
Participation Following Announcement, PENN STATE NEWS (last updated Aug. 22,
2013),
http://news.psu.edu/story/282680/2013/07/25/administration/takecare-your-health-sees-record-participation-following.

29.

Matthew Woessner, PSU’s punitive new health policy is an invasion of privacy: As
(last
updated
Aug.
07,
2013),
I
See
It,
PENNLIVE OP-ED
http://www.pennlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/08/psus_punitive_new_healt
h_policy _is_an_invasion_of _privacy_as_i_see_it.html.

30.

Mathew Woessner, A Call for Action and Civil Resistance for Penn State Employees,
PA. DIV. AAUP (July 30, 2013), https://pa-aaup.com/2013/07/30/the-penn-statehealthcare-mandate-and-a-call-for-civil-disobedience/.

31.

See Mathews & Martin, supra note 9.

32.

Jeff Brady, Penn State To Penalize Workers Who Refuse Health Screenings, NPR
(Aug.
2,
2013),
http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2013/08/02/208167230/penn-state-to-penalize-workers-who-refusehealth-screenings.

33.

Colleen Flaherty, Weigh In or Pay, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jul. 22, 2013),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/07/22/penn-state-faculty-objectdetails-new-preventive-health-care-plan.

34.

Id.

130

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
Moving Beyond "Wellness Does Not Work"

participated in their programs, 35 Penn State chose to implement penalties
for failing to participate in the biometric screening and wellness profile. 36 In
addition, rather than phase in this change to a penalty for failing to
complete the biometric screening and wellness profile, Penn State
introduced penalties that were double the national average among
employers. 37 So, the combination of intrusive questions in the WebMD
wellness profile—such as asking employees whether they had ever driven
after drinking—and the coercive nature of a $1200 penalty for refusing to
reveal that information made employees consider whether employers like
Penn State were digging too deeply into their private lives in the quest for
wellness. 38
To respond to Penn State and Highmark’s efforts to collect their data
and the wellness profile’s intrusive nature, Woessner urged employees to
complete the questionnaire with ludicrous information 39 and told an
interviewer that he had “filled out his WebMD profile with nonsense,” like
“I’m 3 feet 8 inches tall, I weigh 50 pounds, [and] my last cholesterol check
was when I was six months old.” 40
This combination of events—questionable consultation and
communication, intrusive questions that participants could not avoid,
coercive financial penalties for noncompliance, Penn State’s decision to
require sharing health information with Highmark, and Woessner’s creative
encouragement of noncompliant compliance—ensured that the events at
Penn State would gain greater attention. The privacy issues gained
significant local and national media attention, with many news articles and
stories published in major outlets like the Wall Street Journal, the
Philadelphia Inquirer, and the Harvard Business Review, among others. 41

35.

Paul Fronstin, Findings From the 2011 EBRI/MGA Consumer Engagement in Health
Care Survey, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. 1, 1 (Dec. 2011),
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_12-2011_No365_CEHCS.pdf.

36.

Singer, supra note 4.

37.

Soeren Mattke et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Study Final Report, RAND
CORP.
126
(2013),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR254/
RAND_RR254.pdf.

38.

Natasha Singer, Rules Sought for Worksite Wellness Questionnaires, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/business/rules-soughtfor-workplace-wellness-questionnaires.html.

39.

Woessner, supra note 30.

40.

Brady, supra note 32.

41.

See Mathews & Martin, supra note 9; Tom Emerick & Al Lewis, The Danger of
Wellness Programs: Don’t Become the Next Penn State, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 20,
2013), https://hbr.org/2013/08/attention-human-resources-exec; Karen Heller,
Karen Heller: Penn State’s Unpalatable Policy on Health, PHILLY.COM (July 25, 2013),
http://articles.philly.com/2013-07-25/news/40773924_1_penn-state-healthincentives-health-care.
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The University Faculty Senate scheduled a discussion of the issues at
their first meeting on September 10, 2013. 42 Representatives from the
university’ administration and Highmark attended to answer questions
about the program. They may have hoped that the meeting would address
concerns and defuse the growing controversy. Instead, the administration
and Highmark representatives failed to answer faculty concerns, further
fueling the controversy. At this meeting, a faculty member spoke about a
question in the WebMD profile asking female faculty and staff members to
indicate whether they intended to attempt to have a child in the next year. 43
That this question invaded the privacy of faculty members required to
answer it was lost on the Highmark administrator answering her question.
Nor did Highmark or Penn State address the concerns about forcing women
to reveal this information to anyone at the university, much less their
insurer or a third-party vendor like WebMD. The representative’s extended
response focused on the efforts his company was making to ensure that the
information was kept private once it was collected, failing to understand
that the issue was with the fact of its collection and not whether it remained
private. 44 The next person to speak cut to the heart of the privacy issue for
many Penn State employees, describing her “difficulty with [Highmark’s]
definition of private. For me, discussing my reproductive plans with an
unknown entity at an insurance company does not constitute private.” 45
Since Penn State’s University Faculty Senate meetings are recorded and
available to the public, the exchanges in the YouTube video provided in the
New York Times article quickly became part of the national media story. 46
A little more than a week after the meeting, Penn State suspended the
surcharge and the program and announced the formation of a task force to
engage faculty and staff in discussion of the future of health benefits at
Penn State. 47

42.

Dennis Scanlon & Dennis Shea, Statement and White Paper From Penn State
Faculty—”Assessing the Evidence for Penn State University’s “Take Care of Your
Health” Benefits Program,” MONITORING UNIV. GUIDANCE (Sept. 8, 2013),
http://lcbpsusenate.blogspot.com/2013/09/statement-and-white-paper-frompenn.html
(corrected
version
available
at
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/wellness-programs-arent-readyfor-prime-time/).

43.

Natasha Singer, On Campus A Faculty Uprising Over Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/business/on-campus-afaculty-uprising-over-personal-data.html.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

Id.; see also Penn State Professor Questions Administrators about Invasion of
(Sept.
11,
2013),
Employee
Privacy,
YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RUrZLK5yA3Y (YouTube video embedded in
the article).

47.

Powers & Mountz, supra note 10.
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Just days following this decision, Representative Louise Slaughter from
New York cited the issues raised at Penn State as she asked the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to investigate worksitewellness programs and to issue guidelines to protect employees from
discrimination. 48 The EEOC had already met to discuss such guidelines but
had not issued any guidance on the relationship between the ACA’s
provisions for wellness programs and federal antidiscrimination laws like
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act. 49 In May 2016, the EEOC released final rules on
employer wellness programs, addressing both the incentives that
employers may offer to employees, as well as employees’ confidentiality
rights. 50 The rules allow incentives of up to thirty percent of the cost of selfonly coverage to be used for WWPs, including those that involved
questionnaires or medical examinations, but bar incentives for having
employees provide certain types of genetic information. 51 They also
prevent employers from requiring employees to agree to the sale and other
uses of their data and only allow employers to view aggregated information
about their employees’ health. 52
Penn State’s experience with workplace wellness demonstrates some
of the challenges for employers seeking to implement WWPs as they
attempt to balance efforts to gather information to guide improvements in
employee health with privacy and discrimination laws. Isolated incidents of
employees raising concerns about WWPs have occurred over the past few
years53 and the topic has been hotly debated at research and industry
conferences. 54 As employers continue to expand WWPs, they will certainly
test the limits of what employees are willing to accept with respect to
incentives, privacy, and discrimination. The EEOC rules provide guidance on
what is permissible, while Penn State’s experience demonstrates the
constraints on their actions because of employee concerns.

48.

Singer, supra note 43.

49.

Singer, supra note 43.

50.

Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Press Release on EEOC Issues
Final Rules on Employer Wellness Programs (May 16, 2016), available at
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-16-16.cfm.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

Jay Hancock, Workplace Wellness Programs Put Employee Privacy at Risk, WWLP
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://wwlp.com/2015/09/28/workplace-wellness-programsput-employee-privacy-at-risk/.

54.

Susan Dentzer, What’s Missing in the Debate Over Employer Wellness Programs,
CARE
BLOG
(Dec.
4,
2015),
HEALTH
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2015/12/04/whats-missing-in-the-debateover-employer-wellness-programs/.
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III.

Employers, Employee Health, Health Care Costs and
Wellness

Given the privacy issues that wellness programs can cause, the WWPs
would need to provide substantial benefits to encourage employees to
participate in the change. While the benefits of WWPs received far less
media attention than the risks in the case of Penn State, the benefits were
another part of the argument that Penn State and Highmark advanced. This
section focuses on summarizing the University’s effort to advance their case
that the impact of WWPs on two primary outcomes—healthcare costs and
employee health—would be positive for Penn State employees. In
describing the program to Penn State employees, the university identified
reduced health-benefits costs and improved employee and beneficiary
health as important goals of the changes to employee health benefits. 55 As
we discuss in the next section, their arguments’ weaknesses further
undercut their efforts to convince employees to accept the Take Care
program.

IV.

The Impact of Workplace-Wellness Programs on Health

In presenting the case for the Take Care program to employees, Penn
State referenced a handful of studies on the impact of WWPs. 56 Only one of
the studies Penn State cited, a report from the Centers for Disease Control’s
Task Force on Community Preventive Services (“Task Force”), provided a
detailed analysis of the health outcomes associated with WWPs. 57 The
report assessed the value of workplace HRAs and other commonly used
workplace interventions, such as smoking-cessation policies and
immunization initiatives. 58 The study reviewed the evidence on assessment
of health risks with feedback (“AHRF”) programs. AHRF programs include
55.

Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3.

56.

See Annemarie Mountz, Health Care Changes to be Discussed at Faculty Senate
Meeting,
PENN
ST.
UNIV.
NEWS
(Sept.
3,
2013),
http://news.psu.edu/story/286134/2013/09/03/administration/health-carechanges-be-discussed-faculty-senate-meeting (citing Larry S. Chapman, The Art of
Health Promotion, 24 AM. J. OF HEALTH PROMOTION 1 (2009); then citing R. E. Soler et
al., A Systematic Review of Selected Interventions for Worksite Health Promotion,
38 AM. J. OF PREVENTATIVE MED. S237 (2010); Barbara L. Naydeck et al., The Impact
of the Highmark Employee Wellness Programs on 4-Year Healthcare Costs, 50 J. OF
OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 146; L. C. Williams & B. T. Day, Medical Cost Savings for
Web-Based Wellness Program Participants Form Employers Engaged in Health
Promotion Activities, 25:4 AM. J. OF HEALTH PROMOTION 272 (2001)).

57.

Center for Disease Control, Task Force on Community Preventive Services,
Recommendations for Worksite-Based Interventions to Improve Worker’s Health,
J.
OF
PREVENTATIVE
MED.
S232,
S232
(2010),
38
AM.
https://www.thecommunityguide.org/worksite/Worksite2010Recommendation
s_TaskForce.pdf.

58.

Id.
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three elements: (1) the collection of information about at least two
personal health behaviors or indicators; (2) translation of the information
collected into one or more individual risk scores or categorical descriptions
of risk status; and (3) providing participants with feedback regarding their
risk status, either overall or with respect to specifıc risk behaviors. 59 The
report also examined AHRF Plus programs, which are AHRF programs that
include other intervention components in a worksite setting. 60 An AHRF
Plus program, for example, may offer incentives for employees who smoke
to enter a smoking cessation program after their HRA. 61
While Penn State cited the study as evidence of the positive impacts of
WWPs on employee health, the Task Force’s recommendations were mixed
regarding the effectiveness of these various workplace interventions. 62 In
its review, the Task Force indicated that there was insufficient evidence
about the effectiveness of AHRFs when implemented alone as a primary
intervention. 63 For example, the Task Force explained that its
finding of insufficient evidence to determine effectiveness is based
on concerns with recurring combinations of flaws in individual studies
across the body of evidence. The most important concern was the
paucity of comparative studies in which the intervention was offered
to one defined population and outcomes compared to another
defined population that received a lesser (or no) intervention. Many
of the studies identified in this review provided the intervention of
interest (AHRF alone) to the “control” arm of a trial that was primarily
intended to evaluate the effectiveness of a more comprehensive
intervention that included AHRF as a single component. The absence
of measurements from a relevant concurrent comparison group in
these studies raised the potential for bias in the estimated
intervention effects, particularly for self-reported changes in
behavior. Most studies analyzed only a small subset of participants
for whom there were complete follow-up data, which may have
favored the inclusion of results from individuals who had changed
their health behaviors in the interval. 64

While the Task Force reached a more positive assessment of AHRF Plus
programs, Penn State’s efforts did not provide such interventions, at least
in their initial phase. 65 As a result, the university’s communications and
evidence undercut their own claims about positive health impacts.
59.

Id. at S233.

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at S234.

62.

Id. at S233.

63.

Id.

64.
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65.

Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3.
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Additional research presented by faculty during the course of the
subsequent year further clarified that weakness. 66 For example, a review
article on WWPs published just months before the announcement of the
Take Care initiative suggested that the expectation that WWPs are effective
is based on three key assumptions. 67 First, this expectation is predicated on
the assumption that wellness programs can accurately identify employees
with specific health risks and effectively target incentives to employees for
participation in wellness interventions to address these risks more
effectively than usual care. 68 Second, it assumes that financial incentives to
participate in wellness programs will lead employees to change their
behavior in a way that will improve their health. 69 Third, it assumes that
improvements in health will result in cost savings for employers. 70 The first
two assumptions are critical for having an impact on employee health. 71 The
study’s authors, however, found little evidence of improved health as a
result of WWPs. 72 In examining weight-loss programs, the authors examine
four comprehensive literature reviews, none of which find evidence of longterm sustained weight loss. 73 Their review of smoking-cessation programs
similarly found that programs had initial effects, but that there was often
no long-term impact. 74 They found no comprehensive, high quality reviews
of programs to manage high blood pressure or cholesterol. 75
That research was one of a number of studies presented as part of a
report to the University Faculty Senate at the September 2013 meeting and
then in a more detailed report the University’s Health Care Task Force
prepared and presented in April 2014. 76 Those reports included evidence
from comprehensive reviews by a group of researchers, 77 as well as a
66.

See Dennis P. Scanlon & Dennis Shea, Assessing the Evidence for Penn State
University’s “Take Care of Your Health” Benefits Program, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST
(Sept.
9,
2013)
(Corrections
made
Sept.
20,
2013),
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/Scanlon-Shea-Assessing-the-Evidence-for-Penn-StateUniversity_Sept_20_2013_correction.pdf; PA. ST. UNIV. FACULTY SENATE, REPORT OF THE
HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE 27 (2014).

67.

Jill R. Horwitz et al., Wellness Incentive in the Workplace: Cost Savings Through
Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH AFF. 468, 469 (2013).
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Id
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Id. at 471-72.
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PA. ST. UNIV. FACULTY SENATE, supra note 66, at 33.
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See Soeren Mattke et al., supra note 37.
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systematic review of evidence by a related group of investigators. 78 The
report of Penn State’s Health Care Task Force concluded that
workplace wellness programs appear to have, at best, a small, but
statistically significant impact on a few employee health behaviors or
health risks. These appear to be most commonly found in programs
addressing smoking cessation or weight loss. The clinical relevance of
these changes may be very modest. The long-run maintenance of the
improved behaviors/risk reductions and the impact on actual health
outcomes, such as mortality and morbidity, are not well-established
by research. The short-run improvements appear to occur primarily
in programs that apply fairly significant and ongoing incentives
and/or involve more than basic lifestyle management programs. 79

In its efforts to communicate to employees about the positive effects
of WWPs on employee health, Penn State relied almost exclusively on a
single study that did not fully support the features of their program. 80 While
at first glance WWPs’ impact on health may seem like common sense, the
chain of connections to create real health improvements is more complex. 81
Though they have no legal obligation to demonstrate that WWPs truly
improve health, employers have a moral and ethical responsibility to ensure
that their employees are well-informed, especially when the employer
requests, requires, or incentivizes participation in these WWPs.
The impact of WWPs on health care costs is, of course, the second
reason that employers often argue for their implementation. 82 Employers
argue that healthcare cost savings can be passed on to employees through
cost-sharing, lower premiums, or higher wage and salary growth for
employees. 83 The importance of these cost issues was heightened for
employers because the ACA planned to impose a “Cadillac tax” on
employers who had excessive healthcare costs. 84 Among the questions that
the Faculty Senate submitted to the Penn State Benefits Office in advance
of its meeting in September 2013 was one that challenged the quality of the
78.

See Karen Osilla et al., Systematic Review of the Impact of Worksite Wellness
Programs, 18:2 AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE e68, e68 (2012).

79.
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ST.
UNIV.
(Apr.
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2014),
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s-records/april-29-2014-agenda/appendix-s.
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Naydeck et al., supra note 56; Williams & Day, supra note 56.
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See Jill R. Horwitz et al., supra note 67, at 469.
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Katherine Baicker et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can Generate Savings, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1, 3 (2010).
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AFF. 58 (1999).
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2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/04/25/about-that-cadillac-tax/.

137

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
Moving Beyond "Wellness Does Not Work"

evidence supporting the design of the Take Care program and its impact on
costs. 85 In its response, Penn State referenced three studies that focused
primarily on the cost savings associated with wellness programs. 86
One well-known study cited in the university’s response reported a
positive return on investment (“ROI”) of $3.27 in reduced healthcare
sending per dollar spent on wellness programs, experienced over the first
few years of a program’s operation. 87 In addition, the authors reported a
positive return related to reductions in employee absenteeism, estimated
to be valued at $2.73 per dollar spent on wellness programs. 88 As the
authors note, however, these estimates of savings are far less than previous
reports, a result they attributed to the more rigorous evaluation standards
that they applied in reviewing the literature. 89 The authors also listed
important caveats in the limitations section of their study, 90 stating that
their
analysis cannot address the important question of which attributes
of wellness programs are most important, and how such programs
should be optimally designed. Well-designed field experiments that
compare the effectiveness of program components such as patient
education and professional counseling across different industries and
populations are needed to answer it. 91

The university’s response to the Faculty Senate question about
supporting evidence also referenced two published Highmark studies as
evidence supporting the proposed Take Care program. 92 One study
examined the impact of a WWP that Highmark initiated for its own
employees in 2002. 93 It estimated the impact of the program on costs for
four years after the program’s implementation and calculated an overall
ROI. 94 The study’s reported results suggested an overall ROI of $1.76 for
every dollar spent on the wellness program. 95 Specifically, the authors
estimated that participants in Highmark’s wellness program had annual
85.

Mountz, supra note 56.
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See Id.; Soler et al., supra note 56; Naydeck et al., supra note 56; Williams & Day,
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healthcare expenditures that were $176.47 lower than those that did not
participate in the wellness program, with the majority of the savings
resulting from lower hospitalization costs for program participants versus
non-participants. 96
The second Highmark study attempted to examine the impact and
value of the “web based wellness program components” that were added
to existing wellness programs between 2004 and 2007. 97 The study
examined employees whose employers adopted Highmark’s web-based
wellness features—the treatment group—and compared their outcomes to
the outcomes for employees whose employers did not adopt any of
Highmark’s wellness-program components—the control group. 98 The
results showed lower costs for program participants relative to nonparticipants, and also suggested that web-based content can have value. 99
Just as there were questions about the quality of the evidence relating
WWPs to cost savings, there were similar questions about the evidence
relating WWPs to improvements in the health status of wellness-program
participants. Research presented to the University Faculty Senate in
September 2013 and April 2014 demonstrated less dramatic evidence of
cost savings. 100 The university cited only four studies to provide evidence
for the impact of its changes on employee health and healthcare costs and
did so without fully understanding the limitations of the evidence cited. 101
Also problematic about the university’s response to the questions
about evidentiary support for their claims was that two of the three studies
they cited were conducted by parties of interest. Two of the three studies
were from their own third-party administrator, a vendor with a
demonstrated interest in proving the effectiveness of programs that they
were marketing and selling to Penn State and other employers.102 Just as
some policy-makers during the ACA debate seemed to accept the Safeway
evidence without critical review, only to later find important questions
raised about the data, employers and their human-resource offices can be
too reliant on vendors to provide evidence on the effects of WWPs. Reliance
on evidence sources that have an interest in promoting WWPs, coupled
with a failure to fully engage with the evidence base, creates conditions for
employers to face significant employee opposition to WWP.
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As raised in discussions about conflicts of interest in medical
research, 103 vendor-supported studies should be used with caution. There
are many decisions made in evaluation research, including the selection of
the sample; how program and healthcare costs are allocated among the
wellness program, the employer, the employees, and the insurer; how to
address co-occurring changes in health benefits; and a host of other issues
that will impact results. 104 While some of these concerns were noted in the
published studies that Penn State cited, the inherent conflict of interest in
vendor-based research requires employers to be extremely cautious in
basing decisions on such evidence.
Furthermore, the question of whether health improvements actually
lead to cost savings is additionally complicated by the fact that many
employers change their health benefits at the same time as they implement
or add to their WWPs. 105 WWPs involve increased costs associated with
duplicate testing, false positives, and associated follow-up costs. In
addition, in some cases, WWPs simply adjust the timing of costs, rather than
preventing costs; 106 simultaneous changes that adjust consumer costsharing in a variety of ways complicate determining whether costs were
actually reduced or simply shifted across time and between employer and
employee. 107 These program savings might not be the result of health
improvements; instead, savings “may come from making workers with
health risks pay more for their health care than workers without health
risks.” 108 It becomes even more complicated to show employees that they
are benefitting from lower costs when factors other than the WWP are also
changing. 109
Penn State’s efforts to demonstrate the benefits of its WWP on
employee health and healthcare costs evinced some of the pitfalls of trying
to expand wellness programs for employers. The university offered a thin
evidence base for the impact of its changes on employee health and
healthcare costs, without fully understanding the limitations of the
evidence it cited. In its effort to demonstrate the benefits of its WWP, Penn
State also relied on sources of evidence that had conflicts of interest.
Subsequent review of the research demonstrated to the employees that
the evidence for the benefits of the WWP changes was much weaker than
the university had suggested. Penn State failed to adequately communicate
with its faculty and staff, failed to address its employees’ privacy concerns,
103. See generally CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION,
(Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field, eds., 2009).
104. Scanlon & Shea, supra note 66, at 18.
105. Id. at 14.
106. Id. at 15.
107. Id. at 14.
108. Jill R. Horwitz et al., supra note 67, at 469.
109. Scanlon & Shea, supra note 66, at 16.
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and cited studies that failed to dispel—and in some cases, raised—concerns
about the benefits of WWPs, creating an environment of employee distrust.

V.

Summarizing Key Lessons and Future Directions

Penn State’s problematic effort to implement a WWP and its
subsequent decision to drop significant elements of the program
emphasizes the many challenges for employers in trying to use WWPs and
provides some guidance on how employers and employees can move
beyond a “wellness-does-not-work” mentality. Employers and employees
should establish shared ownership of the WWP through extensive
consultation and communication prior to design and implementation of the
plan. In implementing WWPs, employers are asking employees to share
sensitive information and to modify the way they have traditionally
interacted with healthcare providers. Employers claim to be interested in
employee health, but often stress the need to control healthcare costs. Cost
savings are difficult to track and both employers and employees want some
stake in those savings. Without significant consultation and communication
in the design and implementation of the WWP, employees are unlikely to
accept the changes and employers are unlikely to find they have shifted the
needle on health or costs.
Given employers’ growing interest in having employees share personal
health information, employers owe it to their employees to exercise due
diligence, to collect only what is necessary, to protect what is collected, and
to give employees options regarding what information they provide. Dr.
Donald Berwick, President Emeritus and Senior Fellow at the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement and former Administrator of the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, notes that our health system must change
the way it treats information, arguing that medical records should belong
to the patients and adopting the rule of a public-health researcher:
“Nothing about me without me.” 110 Employers engaging in WWPs must
begin with the assumption that the data belongs to the employee/patient,
and allow employees to make the rules about access to their information.
Employers and employees should also work to develop their own
independent assessment of the evidence in support of or against WWPs.
Cherry-picking individual studies or relying on vendors with inherent
conflicts of interest to provide evidence for WWP is unacceptable. Efforts
should focus on a more sophisticated review of the evidence and on
identifying and adopting evidence-based practices. Rigorous evaluations
often dramatically reduce the estimated ROIs from WWPs. Concerns about
conflicts of interest and their impact on medical research are considerable.
Employers and health plans, however, are not in the business of conducting
rigorous evaluations of health programs and have deep conflicts of interest
in the operation of such programs. Employers and employees should work
together to identify evidence from public agencies (e.g., Department of
110. DONALD BERWICK, ESCAPE FIRE: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE (2014).
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Labor, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention), health-services research organizations (e.g.,
RAND, Truven Health Analytics), or private foundations that offer a more
independent and scientific review.
Assessing the evidence requires going beyond just examining WWPs
and their role in the healthcare industry. Employers and employees need to
develop a shared understanding of the real drivers of healthcare inflation
and health-benefits costs, both nationally and in their local regions. Despite
the challenges, both parties need to work together to see how technology,
malpractice, demographic changes, health-benefit design, provider prices
and practice patterns, and more drive costs. Lifestyle and health behaviors
are only one component of the cost equation in healthcare and addressing
only those criteria may not be the easiest or most effective strategy for
controlling costs and improving health. Health-behavior change is hard
work; employees are trying to reverse decades-old lifestyles. In general,
incentives, not penalties, are more effective. 111 In addition, the evidence
base on incentives for health-behavior change is relatively new. Employers
should move cautiously and continually re-evaluate their efforts. Moving
beyond the idea that wellness does not work is likely to require substantial
effort to retreat from the existing standard vendor-driven, third-party, prepackaged set of programs of questionable credibility. Furthermore,
employers and employees need to understand how WWPs fit into the
overall design of their health benefits and in the overall context of their
health system. WWPs focus on changing the behaviors of consumers on the
demand side of healthcare. These programs do little to address the supplyside cost issues. To have an impact on costs and health, employers and
employees should also consider the local cost drivers from the supply side,
especially as healthcare-provider markets change through consolidation,
new payment models, organizational changes like accountable care
organizations and patient-centered medical homes, and efforts to revise
the ACA. In some cases, wellness does not work because substantial
changes are necessary on the supply side of healthcare for costs to fall and
health to improve.
To move beyond the idea that wellness does not work, employers need
to develop an understanding of what components of WWPs work best for
their particular workforce, worksites, and provider markets. They need to
engage in an ongoing discussion with their employees and consultants
about the design of their WWPs and address the challenging privacy issues
with respect to employees’ rights to their own health information. Finally,
if the goal is truly to improve employee health, then employers must
engage in far more discussion with employees about how to help them
change and far fewer conversations with third-party vendors on how to
make employees change.
111. Kevin G. Volpp et al., Redesigning Employee Health Incentives - Lessons from
Behavioral Economics, 365 N. ENG. J. MED. 388, 388-89 (2011).
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